Why is Liberal Britain Dying?

Regular readers of this blog will by now be well aware that if Mediolana CSO Asad Yawar is reading anything, there’s a decent chance that it’s a copy of the Financial Times; a recent piece by political columnist Janan Ganesh demonstrated once again the power of the beige-papered publication of record to inspire. In Strange death of a more liberal Britain (25th March 2013), Ganesh notes that as well as economic growth, ‘the looseness and openness that has historically accounted for much of the UK’s success – and appeal to outsiders – is also in danger of being misplaced’. Citing (i) the recent mooting of a restrictive press law; (ii) the ever-tougher and now cross-party rhetoric on immigration; and (iii) the repeated ‘wounds’ received by the City of London from Westminster and Brussels, Ganesh laments the loss of tolerance for ‘tolerating real messiness in economic and public life’.

There is little doubt that in many basic ways the United Kingdom (as at least partially opposed to London) has become (and will probably continue to become) a much less ‘liberal’ place than it previously has been. But why is this? After some contemplation, we feel that this trend can be largely explained by the loss of the ‘three cogencies’ of liberalism in the local (and to some degree, global) context:

1. Economic Cogency. With the ongoing and epoch-defining financial collapse which began to make itself felt in 2007, (extreme) economic liberalism has begun to resemble communism: a nice theory that doesn’t necessarily work very well. Rapid-fire financialisation, self-regulation and endless credit were once synonymous with Progress. Now it has become abundantly clear that implementation of these previously unquestionable tenets of (post-)modern growth can in fact destroy economic value far faster than they create it, it is scarcely surprising that to many observers, economic liberalism has lost its appeal.

2. Social Cogency. The cold, hard statistics consistently show that non-UK nationals are a much lighter burden on the state than UK nationals; that they are more entrepreneurial and very significant sources of inward investment; and that if your economy is not attractive to immigrants, you are probably in big, big trouble. But none of this matters if large sections of the media and public taken as a whole prefer to ignore these ‘dry facts’. In a country of increasing economic insecurity and an ever-diminishing global status, the truth is often simply unpalatable for much of the population.

3. Intellectual Cogency. With Francis Fukuyama’s End of History thesis broadly accepted at face value, liberal theoreticians and practitioners alike have been busy fulfilling his ‘prophecies’ with unerring accuracy. Ever-expanding albeit rather selective social freedoms – to marry someone regardless of their gender, to purchase alcohol in a bar 24-7, to never stop shopping – have not papered over the crisis of meaning (and since 2007, sustenance) that has become all-too-apparent since the end of the Cold War. If liberalism can no longer say anything profound about the world or remedy any of its most pressing problems, we should not be surprised at its atrophying – however regrettable this may be.

Post-Liberalism: An Ideology About Nothing?

Regular readers of this blog we doubtless be aware that Mediolana’s CSO is rarely seen without a copy (though not necessarily one he has read cover-to-cover) of the Financial Times, indubitably a publication of choice in these extraordinary times where even the most sacred political and economic orthodoxies are being questioned. And it was with some anticipation that he began to read a piece by David Goodhart – a figure who is no less than the head honcho at think-tank Demos, headquartered in the (formerly) dilapidated London neighbourhood of Southwark – which promised to set out nothing less that a new conceptualisation of politics.

Welcome to the post-liberal majority (11th May 2012) posits that the ‘new’ ideology of ‘post-liberalism’ has as its central goal the addressing of ‘the silences, excesses and unintended consequences of economic and social liberalism’, including ‘unchecked’ immigration. It would combine social conservatism – based around the trinity of ‘flag, faith and family’ – with an economic policy that is vagueness itself but can be read as being slightly more to the ideological left than the status quo, the ultimate mission being to ‘reform capitalism’, which is thought of as inherently ‘bad’.

Following some considered reflection, our CSO made the following observations:

1. Lack of Anything Much. It is articles such as this which make we at Mediolana seriously concerned for the future of the United Kingdom. The paucity of vision, contextual knowledge of the British experience or insights from other countries left us pensively staring at the remains of our cappuccino.

2. Education, Education, Education. Perhaps ingeniously, no mention was made of the elephant in the room: the circa 300% increase in university tuition fees, a move which at a stroke virtually guarantees social ghettoisation for future generations in the UK; slashed expenditure on educational capital was also glossed over. Instead, ‘discipline and character’ were extolled – as if these qualities were ever somehow expendable.

3. Ever Played Sim City? There was no discussion whatsoever of what can be done to stem Britain’s economic decline, much less a realisation that successful countries create goods and services that are in global demand. If Goodhart’s thesis is at all representative, there appear to be no plans at all to confront this issue – and enable the UK to pay its own way without having to resort to the doomed fiscal magic of schemes such as ‘indefinite’ bonds.