The Islamists Are Coming – Not! Central Myth of Arab Spring ‘Increasingly Untenable’

Back in the days when the term ‘Arab Spring’ referred to a dubious brand of mineral water, one of the main arguments for Western support of Middle Eastern dictatorships posited by some experts in the field of International Relations (‘IR’) was that no matter how bad the incumbent in the presidential seat (or royal throne), the alternative would be infinitely worse – and there was only ever one alternative, a Muslim fundamentalist  (later ‘Islamist’) theocrat whose despotism would not be tempered by sensitivity to the energy needs of the (then) industrialised world.

Barely two years after the commencement of the political upheavals in the MENA region, this longstanding thesis – like many a Mediterranean economy – is on the verge of total bankruptcy, even though relatively few commentators appear to have realised this.

1. Theocracy? What Theocracy? Any reasonable awareness of post-1990 trends in political thought within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (‘OIC’) member countries would lead to the conclusion that the popularity of the paradoxically modern theocratic model – even amongst conservative Islamists – was on the wane. Particularly after the end of the Cold War and the rise of satellite television, autocratic models of all hues have been increasingly under pressures they cannot easily control, as well as being unfashionable; by the mid-2000s, even some of the most socially radical groups had embraced political democracy as an ideal – which, crucially, meant embracing political competition.

2. Bread and Games. While people cannot be content with flatbread and football alone, any government which fails to provide these goods is likely to find itself in trouble. The main Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia, which enjoyed considerable logistical and organisational advantages over both their ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ rivals, have seen political capital accrued over many decades squandered in a matter of months because they have not managed to fulfil the basic expectations of their populations. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has seen its affiliated Freedom and Justice Party plummet from an expected near-monopoly of power at various stages in 2011 to a 24.78% share of the vote in the first round of the summer 2012 presidential elections, with the FJP widely expected to fare considerably worse during this April’s parliamentary polls as the cost of living and soccer behind closed doors take their toll; Tunisia’s Ennahda Movement formed a coalition government in 2011, and with its popularity eroding is now likely to form a government of national unity. Full-spectrum dominance this is not.

3. Second Thoughts. With the erratic performance of the Freedom and Justice Party all-too-obvious, the idea that Muslim Brotherhood-populated or inspired political parties would sweep all before them in a democratising region does not appear credible, with Jordan’s recent parliamentary elections proving instructive: the Islamic Action Front’s boycott (together with that of several other smaller parties of various ideological hues) did little to dampen the final turnout, reported as being 56.6%.

The Cash of Civilisations: Brazil ‘May Join’ the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation!

FM Antonio #Patriota indicates #Brazil's interest in joining the #OIC as an observer nation, joining #Russia, #Thailand tinyurl.com/at7rnor—
Asad Yawar (@Mediolana) January 05, 2013

France’s Proposed Genocide Denial Law: Principled Stand or Armenian Roulette?

As diplomatic spats go, on one level it is one of the most unlikely: the falling out of France and Turkey over events that occurred the best part of a century ago in Asia Minor and its hinterlands. But the passage of a bill in a sparsely-attended session of the Assemblée nationale - France’s lower legislative chamber – could have consequences much more profound and far-reaching than most commentators have perceived. The proposed law seeks to criminalise denial of the 1915 Armenian genocide, punishing offenders with a €45,000.00 fine and a one-year jail sentence; Turkey, which strongly disagrees with the categorisation of the events of 1915 as genocide, has responded in no uncertain terms, recalling its ambassador from Paris and freezing all major bilateral ties with its NATO ally.

Much of the analysis thus far has focused on the short-term political considerations behind the initiation and passage of the bill, as well as Ankara’s swift reprisals, particularly in the context of trade between France and Turkey. Yet it seems surprising that few others have picked up on the following points:

1. Freedom of Speech. The criminalisation of genocide denial raises a lot of uncomfortable questions about freedom of speech, which many not only in France but in the West more generally regard as an absolute value inherent to Western culture. Of course, freedom of speech as it is understood today is a relatively new concept – it is something which has become necessary and meaningful in the era of modern, all-powerful states and corporations – and in reality virtually every society still has its shibboleths. With the passage of the bill, the French National Assembly is merely confirming this. But is imprisoning people for holding an opinion about an historical event, no matter how reprehensible or plain inaccurate that opinion may be, at all commensurate with the protection and practice of fundamental human rights? And is this measure not merely mirroring certain restrictive provisions in the outgoing and heavily-criticised 1982 Turkish Constitution?

2. An Electoral Miscalculation? Much has been made of the estimated 500,000-strong Armenian community resident in France and the importance attached to their votes by Nicolas Sarkozy‘s Union for a Popular Movement (‘UMP’); the proposed law certainly looks as if it was drafted with this constituency at least partly in mind. Yet in terms of pure realpolitik, this looks to be an increasingly bizarre gesture: no one seems to have told the 23rd President of the French Republic that there is now a Franco-Turkish community roughly the same size of the Armenian one and which is a vital bridge to the burgeoning and/or resource rich economies of Turkey and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (‘OIC’). In trying to appeal to one constituency, the UMP may have alienated a much more economically and politically valuable one.

3. Armenia: The Biggest Loser. As attention has focused on the personalities of Sarkozy, France’s Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Alain Juppé and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, few seem to have any thoughts for the Republic of Armenia itself. And this matters, because even by the standards of the former Soviet Union, Armenia’s economy is in dire straits: Forbes magazine rated it as the second worst in the world in July 2011. While this is doubtless something of a subjective analysis, Armenia is in desperate need of a thaw in relations with neighbouring Turkey – with which it does not presently have normal diplomatic relations – as this is potentially a huge market for Armenian exports: even though the land border between the two nations is closed, bilateral trade was estimated at around US$200m in 2010, making Turkey one of Armenia’s biggest trading partners. Recent developments are unlikely to be encourage this process.

The Organisation for Islamic Cooperation: Poised for Prominence?

The late 2000s and early 2010s are an era in which the world order appears to be transmogrifying by the day, and in this context mediolana.wordpress.com has already posed the question of whether the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is the new NATO. But amidst all the new acronyms – SCO, BRICS and BRICIS – Mediolana believe that one international institution of potentially vital significance is being overlooked: the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (‘OIC’).

The OIC – founded as the Organisation of the Islamic Conference on 25th September 1969 at Rabat, Morocco – is an organisation presently consisting of 57 member states. Despite the population of these member states totalling an estimated 1.6bn – greater than China – the OIC has until recently experienced a negligible global profile; its credibility has been strained by many factors, including the pronounced democratic deficit and poor governance that have prevailed within most of its constituent countries during its existence.

However, there are signs that the OIC is getting ready to play a much bigger role in international affairs during the coming decades:

1. Organisational Reform. Under the leadership of its 9th Secretary-General – Prof. Dr. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, an academic who has held posts at the University of Exeter, Istanbul University and Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich, and who was elected to his current position in 2004 – the OIC has implemented substantial reforms under the theme of ‘modernisation and moderation’. Particularly instructive in this regard are two documents: (i) the Ten-Year Programme of Action to Face the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, a 2005 document which contains numerous objectives relating to economic and social development; and (ii) a new OIC Charter, adopted on 14th March 2008. Additionally, the OIC took on its current, more dynamic name on 28th June 2011.

2. Reform Within Member States. The Arab Spring has led to wildly unpopular dictators being overthrown in Tunisia and Egypt with other OIC member states such as Syria, Libya and Yemen likely to follow suit. However, reformist impulses can be seen elsewhere in the OIC, including in already broadly democratic countries such as Turkey and Indonesia. These processes should have the effect of, in turn, making the OIC stronger insofar as it is the sum of its parts.

3. Energy Abundance. Nine out of the twelve members of OPEC are also in the OIC, giving the latter organisation enormous potential leverage in global affairs. Moreover, many OIC member countries – from Mediterranean nations such as Albania and Algeria to desert-dominated Sudan and Saudi Arabia - are located in warm and sunny climes seemingly made for solar power generation; the headquarters of the International Renewable Energy Agency (‘IRENA’) are located in Masdar City in the United Arab Emirates.

4. Economic Potential. While acres of coverage have been lavished on the so-called BRICS nations, comparatively little has been penned concerning another Goldman Sachs formulation, the Next Eleven (‘N-11′). These are eleven countries which, in addition to the BRICS, have the potential of becoming the world’s largest economies during this century – and seven of the eleven are OIC member states.

5. A Growing International Reputation. Russia became an OIC observer state in 2005, with the United States appointing a Special Envoy to the OIC three years later; India’s membership application is presently being blocked by Pakistan. The present UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has called the OIC ‘a strategic and crucial partner of the United Nations‘ in recognition of its increasing salience.