The 2011 elections to the Turkish parliament are being held today, and most voters are expected to back one of two political parties: the ruling Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym: AKP) or the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). The former is expected to romp home with a significant majority, perhaps even one large enough to unilaterally rewrite Turkey’s creaking 1982 constitution, a document promulgated under military tutelage; that the process is being seriously observed not only regionally but globally is in itself a significant indicator of Turkey’s increasing prominence on the world stage.
However, Mediolana has noticed a pronounced trend within contemporary Turkish politics that indicates the political system is not functioning as well as it should: many of the votes cast for the two main parties seem to be ballots cast for a ‘least worst’ option rather than reflecting resounding agreement with respective policy positions. A significant chunk of those voting for the AKP will do so not because they form part of the ‘post-Islamist’ party’s ‘natural’ constituency, but because the AKP is the only mainstream party which has consistently proffered the possibility of a more inclusive and democratic country, even though its actions have often not matched its rhetoric. Similarly, many of those whose first choice is the CHP are not particularly secular or military-leaning in orientation as one might expect; instead, they wish to express their disappointment with the perceived illiberal tendencies of the AKP, particularly the charismatic but volatile Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
This polarisation is an anomaly in an electoral system which, while featuring what is perhaps an unnaturally high electoral threshold of 10%, is still flexible and dynamic enough for new entrants to gain significant leverage: the AKP, formed only in 2001, was in government before the end of 2002. There is clearly a large gap for a credible third party on the Turkish political scene to campaign on the following issues:
1. Democratisation. While the AKP has done much to make Turkey a more democratic country, ironically its performance has fallen short of the expectations it has helped create. Turkey is placed a woeful 138th in the 2010 Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index, is rated as only a ‘partly free‘ state by Freedom House, and still suffers from many other human rights deficiencies. A party with a coherent legislative roadmap of how to remedy these ills would stand to excel electorally.
2. Energy. As in many countries, the bill for imported fossil fuels is one of the biggest drains on the Turkish economy, yet successive AKP administrations have failed to take advantage of the country’s exceptional location for solar and wind energy, instead pursuing a bizarre and very unpopular nuclear-hydroelectric trajectory. The Turkish public is in this respect far more visionary than its representatives: an April 2011 survey showed that 64% of Turks are opposed to the construction of proposed nuclear plants, while 84% see renewables as the best solution for Turkey’s future energy needs.
3. Environment and conservation. While the AKP is in no sense alone in pursuing policies that ride roughshod over Turkey’s environmental and conservation imperatives, they have done little to curb this tendency: churning a 40 mile canal between the Black Sea and the Marmara Sea, proceeding with the notorious Ilisu Dam project and destroying nature reserves in the name of energy generation installations are all on the agenda. These policies are neither alluring nor efficacious.
4. Transportation. As Mayor of Istanbul (1994-1998), Recep Tayyip Erdogan gained a reputation as an excellent administrator who was particularly gifted in the area of public transportation provision. However, in recent years progress in this area has been slow, with Ankara and Izmir particularly underserved for cities of their size and complexity; biking facilities in most Turkish metropolises are sparse. A little imagination in this area would go a long way.
5. Women. While some women occupy enviable positions in Turkish society – the articulate and glamourous leader of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (‘TUSIAD‘), Umit Boyner, being a case in point – females are chronically underrepresented in many areas of Turkish life, notably high-level political decision-making. A party which can address Turkey’s very low ranking in the 2010 Global Gender Gap Index (126/134) stands to secure a lot of votes.